PREFERRED STOCK REDEMPTIONS: LIMITING
LIABILITY UNDER DGCL § 160
William N. Lay ∗
INTRODUCTION

Preferred stock redemption rights can create serious problems
for issuers and their boards of directors. At first glance, redemption
rights seem relatively harmless. After all, redemption rights simply
require an issuer to repurchase its preferred stock on pre-designated
terms at a pre-designated time. 1 However, restrictions on redemption
rights imposed by Delaware law can transform seemingly innocuous
obligations into a ticking time bomb capable of detonation without
How can preferred stock
warning and with disastrous results. 2
redemption rights be characterized as a time bomb? What causes this
bomb to go off? What steps can a company take to diffuse the bomb?
This Article will answer these questions.
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1 RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE CORPORATION § 2:24 (2015) (noting
that “[r]edemption is essentially a repurchase of shares.”). However, the terms
“redemption” and “repurchase” do not have identical meanings. The primary
difference between a redemption and a repurchase is that a redemption
involves the buyback of redeemable preferred stock, where the terms and
buyback price were previously negotiated before the issuance of the preferred
stock, while a repurchase involves a buyback where the price and terms were
not previously negotiated. See SEALY & WORTHINGTON, CASES AND
MATERIALS IN COMPANY LAW 522 (8th ed. 2007). In addition, these terms are
defined differently in other areas of corporate law, such as taxation. See I.R.C.
§ 317(b) (1954).

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1998);
SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 987 (Del. Ch. 2010),
judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011) (noting common
law restrictions).

2
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Mandatory and discretionary redemption rights are often
negotiated and included in the preferences of preferred stock. 3
Redemption rights provide issuers financial flexibility, allowing them to
redeem preferred stock to secure financing on favorable terms, 4 take the
firm public via an initial public offering (“IPO”), 5 or engage in other
transactions. 6 Consequently, it is clear that redemption rights serve a
legitimate and valuable business purpose for issuers.
Despite the benefits they provide, redemption rights have an
inherent, critical shortcoming—an issuer’s ability to redeem its preferred
stock is restricted by Delaware law. 7 Delaware General Corporation Law
(the “DGCL”) § 160 and Delaware common law prohibit issuers from
redeeming preferred stock under certain conditions, such as where the
redemption would impair the capital of the issuer. 8 An issuer’s failure to
redeem its preferred stock when redemption is required can cause
noncompliance with a redemption provision and thus negative

C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett, Delaware Insider: Drafting A
Mandatory Put Provision for Preferred Stock After ThoughtWorks, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.
2012, at 1 (noting that mandatory redemption provisions are “frequently
bargained for”).
3

3 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 18:13 (3d ed. 2015)
(“Corporations frequently reserve the option to redeem preferred shares at a
certain redemption price in order to facilitate future financing.”); 11 FLETCHER
CYC. CORP. § 5309 (2015) (describing redemption rights as a “valuable right in
the event that market rates of interest fall so as to make refinancing
attractive.”).
4

In general, issuers must dispose of their preferred shares before going public.
See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV.
315, 339 (2005). This is most often accomplished via conversion provisions. Id.
However, mandatory redemption provisions have also been used for this
purpose. See Clean Harbors Inc., Certificate of Incorporation (Ex. 3.70, Form
S-4) (April 3, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/822818/
000104746913003900/a2214091zex-3_70.htm (requiring the mandatory
redemption of the preferred stock if a “Qualifying IPO” is made).
5

Booth, supra note 1. Redemption can also benefit issuers by relieving them of
obligations, such as dividend payments or coupon rates, associated with the
preferred stock.

6

7

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2010); ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 987.

8

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2010); see infra notes 35–37.
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9

consequences for the issuer. Redemptions that are made illegally (i.e. in
violation of DGCL § 160) also result in liability for both the issuer and
its board of directors. 10 To avoid these problems, well-advised issuers
must carefully draft the preferences of the preferred stock to ensure: (1)
the probability that an issuer will be able to redeem its preferred stock
when necessary is as high as possible, and (2) if redemption is restricted
under Delaware law, the issuer’s liability is limited. However, as this
Article shows, issuers and their legal counsel have sometimes struggled
to so effectively. 11
In drafting redemption rights, issuers sometimes rely on
disproven, ineffective drafting techniques that have been rendered
ineffective by recent court decisions. 12 Litigation resulting from issuers’
failure to effectuate required redemptions demonstrates that current
drafting norms and techniques do not always protect issuers. 13 The
problem, simply put, is: How may issuers draft redemption provisions in
a way that maximizes the probability that they will be able to effectuate a
redemption when necessary, while shielding themselves from liability
where redemption is impossible?
An issuer’s failure to make a required redemption can trigger: (1) liability
and/or (2) other consequences, if the failure to make a redemption is a Voting
Rights Triggering Event (“VRTE”) or a penalty provision exists. See
ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 991. Some penalty provisions require the
redemption to be paid in the form of a one-year note to each unredeemed
holder, while others allow the preferred shareholders to elect a majority of the
issuer’s board of directors until the redemption is paid. Id. (noting common
“penalty provisions”).
9

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1998) (imposing joint and several liability on
an issuer’s board of directors for making a redemption in violation of DGCL
§ 160).
10

See TCV VI, L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., No. CV 10164-VCN, 2015 WL
1598045, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal refused, 115 A.3d 1216 (Del.
2015); Brevan Howard Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys.,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 9209-VCG, 2014 WL 2943570, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014).
11

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 976; C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett,
Delaware Insider: Drafting A Mandatory Put Provision for Preferred Stock After
ThoughtWorks, BUS. L. TODAY, January 2012, at 1, 3 (recommending that
practitioners “consider alternatives to [funds legally available] when drafting
mandatory put provisions.”).
12

13

See cases cited supra note 11.
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To address this problem, this Article scrutinizes three recent
decisions by the Delaware Chancery Court pertaining to restrictions on
preferred stock redemptions: SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks,
Inc., 14 TCV VI, L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., 15 and Brevan Howard Credit
Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc. 16 These cases offer
insight into the way Delaware courts interpret and construe redemption
provisions—lessons and insights that this Article evaluates and then
condenses into a series of suggested practices for issuers.
This Article’s analysis is confined to expansion-stage private to
public companies, although the statements and analysis of law may be
useful to other parties. 17 The rationale for this limitation is simple;
smaller companies have less bargaining power when it comes to
negotiating redemption rights and will likely be pressured into accepting
terms proposed by a larger investor, such as a venture capitalist. 18
Consequently, small, private companies will be unable to enact many of
the suggested practices that this Article recommends. 19 In addition, the
14

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 976.

15 TCV VI, L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., No. CV 10164-VCN, 2015 WL
1598045, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal refused, 115 A.3d 1216 (Del.
2015).

Brevan Howard Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys.,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 9209-VCG, 2014 WL 2943570, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014).

16

An expansion-stage company has a commercially available product or service
that generates significant revenue growth, but may not be yet be profitable.
Brett Church, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2006-2007: IX. Venture
Capital and Private Equity, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 76, n.45 (2007). This
Article focuses on companies that range from growth stage privately held firms
to fully developed publically traded corporations. Since the vast majority of
public companies are Delaware corporations, the analysis focuses exclusively on
Delaware law. Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate
Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 75 (2015) (noting that two-thirds of U.S.
public companies are incorporated under Delaware corporate law).
17

See infra note 19 (“Venture capital is often a financing source of ‘last resort.’
Companies that seek venture capital financing are generally left with no other
alternatives for financing and are therefore in a weak bargaining position.”).
Venture capitalists may be unwilling to deviate from standard documents, such
as NVCA forms, that do not adhere to the suggested practices of this Article.

18

19 Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian Rebuttal to the
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 152 (1997).
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analytical perspective is that of issuer’s counsel. The interests of issuers
and preferred stockholders may diverge in ways that affect the
considerations and conclusions of this Article.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces and
describes redemption restrictions imposed by DGCL § 160 and
Delaware common law. Specifically, Part I breaks down the mechanics
of DGCL § 160 and explains, in a general manner, the analysis required
by DGCL § 160, such as the calculation of a company’s surplus and
capital. In addition, Part I describes redemption restrictions imposed by
Delaware common law and notes distinctions between the common law
tests and the requirements of DGCL § 160. Finally, Part I highlights the
potential consequences issuers face if they fail to redeem their preferred
stock when redemption is required, including actions for breach of
contract.
Next, Part II analyzes the methodology used by the Delaware
Chancery Court in interpreting and construing redemption restrictions
and provisions in the three cases cited supra—ThoughtWorks, 20 TCV, 21
and Brevan. 22 Part II explains the relevant facts and analysis used in each
case and highlights “take away” points that practitioners should observe.
These “take away” points show that changing contemporary drafting
practices will benefit issuers.
Part III recommends that issuers implement the suggested
practices listed in Part II. First and foremost, Part III encourages issuers
to avoid problems associated with redemption restrictions altogether by
excluding mandatory redemption provisions and put rights, a form of
discretionary redemption trigged at the option of the holder, from the
preferences of their preferred stock. 23 When such provisions must be

20

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 976.

21 TCV VI, L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., No. CV 10164-VCN, 2015 WL
1598045, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal refused, 115 A.3d 1216 (Del.
2015).

Brevan Howard Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys.,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 9209-VCG, 2014 WL 2943570, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014).

22

The Article will argue that the same benefits to a corporation that are
accomplished via mandatory redemption provisions can be adequately

23
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included, Part III advises that issuers include language that excuses
redemption where redemption is prohibited by law. In addition, Part III
suggests that issuers include a pro rata redemption clause to create
flexibility in the event that redemption is restricted. Part III also explains
that selecting a process for valuing corporate assets prior to issuing the
preferred stock is advisable and may preclude challenges to an issuer’s
calculation of net assets and surplus.
Part III further advises issuer’s counsel to exclude provisions that
punish the issuer for failing to redeem its preferred stock (referenced
herein as “negative drafting”), such as Voting Rights Triggering Events
(“VRTE”) and penalty provisions. Where negative drafting cannot be
avoided, Part III recommends that issuers carefully draft penalty
provisions or VRTE triggers so that these penalties will not apply when
Delaware law prohibits redemption. Finally, Part III cautions issuers to
beware of “specific action” clauses.
The Article ends with a summary conclusion explaining the
practical value of this Article and suggesting certain practices. By
implementing the suggested practices proposed in Part III, issuer’s
counsel can proactively reduce their clients’ litigation risk 24 and, as a
result, reduce costs. 25 By following this guidance, issuer’s counsel can
add value to transactions involving redemption provisions while at the
same time reducing his or her client’s risk. 26

addressed through the use of optional redemption provisions, allowing the
preferred stock to be redeemed at the option of the company.
24 See ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 976. This Article discourages the inclusion
of mandatory redemption provisions and the use of option call rights.
Avoiding these provisions can reduce a client’s litigation risk. See Brevan
Howard Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No.
CIV.A. 9209-VCG, 2014 WL 2943570, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014).
25 By reducing litigation risk, clients reduce costs. Avoiding default rights that
non-redemption can trigger may also lower costs.

By taking this Article’s advice, counsel can maximize the probability that their
clients will be able to redeem its preferred stock when redemption is required.
This, in turn, prevents the triggering of penalty provisions or VRTE’s, which
can result in board disruption, fiscal consequences, or both. See ThoughtWorks,
Inc., 7 A.3d at 991 (discussing penalty provisions).
26
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PART I: REDEMPTION RESTRICTIONS UNDER DGCL § 160 AND
DELAWARE COMMON LAW

As previously noted, Delaware law restricts an issuer’s ability to
redeem its preferred stock. 27 These restrictions are embodied in the
Delaware General Corporation Law, as well as Delaware common law. 28
This Part will explore the theory behind redemption restrictions, explain
the way these redemption restrictions function, and outline the different
mathematical calculations used to determine whether an issuer may
legally redeem its stock.
A. The Theory of Redemption Restrictions
As discussed above, it is clear that redemption provisions serve a
legitimate and valuable purpose for issuers by creating financial flexibility
in their operations. 29 Why would the Delaware legislature and Delaware
courts place restrictions on such a value-adding provision? Indeed,
redemption restrictions under Delaware law are not designed to protect
an issuer’s shareholders, the issuer’s board of directors, or even the
issuing corporation itself; the parties that stand to benefit from
redemption rights. 30 Restrictions on redemption rights exist to protect
the creditors of Delaware corporations. 31
Why is this protection necessary? The answer, in part, lies in the
realities of corporate form. When a creditor contracts with a limited or
general partnership in Delaware, the creditor may levy against the
personal assets of the general partners if corporate assets are exhausted. 32

27

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2010).

28

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 987 (noting common law restrictions).

29

See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.

30 ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 982 (“Section 160's restrictions on redemptions
are intended to protect creditors.”); see also DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL.,
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY
266 (2d ed. 2012).

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 982; see also Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405
(Del. 1962).
31

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403(b) (2015) (describing liability of a general
partner in a limited partnership); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-306 (2011)
(“Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, all
32
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However, this remedy is not available to creditors who contract with
corporations, since shareholders in a Delaware corporation typically have
limited liability. 33 Without redemption restrictions, a corporation could
theoretically distribute all of its assets, including those borrowed from
creditors, to its shareholders, rendering the company insolvent and
leaving creditors unable to recover. 34 Therefore, redemption restrictions,
along with other restrictions such as those imposed on dividends by
DGCL § 170, serve to protect creditors by prohibiting issuers from
“purchas[ing] or redeem[ing] its own shares of capital stock for cash or
other property when the capital of the corporation is impaired or when
such purchase or redemption would cause any impairment of the capital
of the corporation.” 35
Having discussed the theory and purpose behind redemption
restrictions generally, this Part will now discuss the way redemption
restrictions work. As noted previously, redemption restrictions have two
sources: statutory law (DGCL § 160) and common law. 36 We begin our
exploration by analyzing Delaware statutory law.
B. DGCL §160
Redemption restrictions have been a part of the Delaware
General Corporation Law for over 100 years now. 37 As a general rule,
under DGCL § 160, a company may not redeem or repurchase shares of
its own capital stock when the capital of the corporation is either: (1)
already impaired, or (2) would be impaired as a result of the repurchase

partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership
unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.”).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(6) (2015); BRANSON, supra note 30, at 266
(The corporate debtor’s shareholder-owners have limited liability . . . .”).

33

34 ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 982 (“As a practical matter, the test operates
roughly to prohibit distributions to stockholders that would render the
company balance-sheet insolvent . . . .”).
35

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2010); see ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 982.

36

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

37

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 991.
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38

or redemption.
This restriction is sometimes referenced as the
“balance sheet” or “capital impairment” limitation. 39 A repurchase is
said to impair the capital of the issuer if the funds used in the repurchase
exceed the amount of the issuer’s “surplus.” 40 Therefore, to determine
whether a redemption is permitted under DGCL § 160, one must
compare the cost of the redemption to the amount of the issuer’s
surplus. 41
1. How Surplus is Calculated
The term “surplus” is defined in DGCL § 154, amidst
convoluted language, to be “[t]he excess, if any, at any given time, of the
net assets of the corporation over the amount so determined to be
capital . . . .” 42 In plain English, surplus is the excess of net assets over
capital. 43 This is typically equivalent to a balance sheet insolvency test. 44
Therefore, to compute surplus, one must first calculate the capital and
net assets of the corporation.
2. Calculation of Capital and Net Assets
The “capital,” sometimes called “stated capital” 45 of a
corporation is calculated differently depending on whether the issuer’s
stock has a par value. When the issuers stock has a par value, capital
equals the par value of issuer’s shares, increased by any further amount
of consideration paid for the stock that the board of directors decides to
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2010). The general rule is subject to some
exceptions noted in the statute. Id.

38

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(6) (2015); BRANSON, supra note 30, at 266.
Outside of Delaware, some states may use an additional model called the
“earned surplus” approach, which was incorporated in earlier versions of the
MBCA. Id.

39

40

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 982.

41

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2010).

42

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2010).

43

18 C.J.S. CORPORATIONS § 176 (2016).

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 987 (“[A] corporation cannot be balance-sheet
insolvent and meet the requirements of Section 160.”).

44

45

BRANSON, supra note 30, at 267.
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46

allocate as capital.
Therefore, if an issuer had 10 million shares of
common stock outstanding, par value $0.01 per share, and the issuer’s
board of directors decided not to allocate any further consideration from
the shares to capital, than the issuer would have capital of $100,000. 47
However, when the issuer’s stock has no par value, the entire amount
received as consideration for the shares is capital, unless the board
designates otherwise. 48 Therefore, if an issuer had 10 million shares of
common stock outstanding, no par value, and received consideration of
$1 per share, than the issuer would have capital of $10,000,000.
Defining the “net assets” of an issuer is a bit easier, yet, in
practice, is more likely to lead to litigation due to disputes over the
valuation of items. 49 In this context, “net assets” means the amount by
which total assets exceed total liabilities.” 50 However, problems arise
when defendants and plaintiffs use different methodology or valuation
principles when valuing an issuer’s assets for the purposes of calculating

46 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2010); BRANSON, supra note 30, at 267. In
accounting terms, the board can decide to allocate “paid in capital” to the
corporation’s capital. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN,
Determination of Amount of Capital and Surplus, in § 5.22 DEL. LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGARNIZATIONS (Supp. 2016). However, as
a default rule, if the board does nothing, the capital is the par value of the
shares. Id.

Note that in addition to allocating consideration paid for stock as “capital,”
an issuer’s board of directors may also re-allocate part of its surplus as capital.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2010) (“The capital of the corporation may be
increased from time to time by resolution of the board of directors directing
that a portion of the net assets of the corporation in excess of the amount so
determined to be capital be transferred to the capital account.”).
47

See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 46 (“At the time no par shares are
issued . . . the directors may determine what portion of the consideration
applicable to the shares of any class or series shall be ‘capital.’ The portion so
determined shall be the ‘stated capital’ attributable to these shares. If no such
determination is made, all of the consideration shall be ‘capital.’). Therefore, if
the board does nothing, the entire amount of the consideration received in
exchange for the non-par value shares is “capital,” by default. Id.
48

Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 152 (Del. 1997)
(discussing dispute concerning methods of valuing a corporation’s assets).
49

50

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2010).
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51

net assets. Generally, issuers and their boards of directors are granted
discretion in this regard. 52 The Delaware Supreme Court has stated:
Directors have reasonable latitude to
depart from the balance sheet to calculate
surplus, so long as they evaluate assets
and liabilities in good faith, on the basis
of acceptable data, by methods that they
reasonably believe reflect present values,
and arrive at a determination of the
surplus that is not so far off the mark as
to constitute actual or constructive
fraud. 53
As a matter of best practice, the assets of a corporation should
generally be measured at actual present value, even if the “book value”
reflected on the issuer’s formal balance sheet is different. 54 This idea was
solidified by the seminal case of Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.,
where the Delaware Supreme Court allowed a corporation to deviate
from the “book” value of its assets and instead revalue its assets at
present value. 55 The court remarked, “[a]llowing corporations to revalue
assets and liabilities to reflect current realities complies with the statute
and serves well the policies behind this statute.” 56
3. Sample Calculations
Having explained what “surplus,” “capital,” and “net assets” are
and how to calculate them, one may verify their understanding of these
51

Klang, 702 A.2d at 154–55 (dispute over valuation of issuer’s assets).

52

Id. at 152.

53

Id.

James D. Honaker and Eric S. Klinger-Wilensky, Dividends, Redemptions and
Stock Purchases, Practical Law Practice Note 1-519-2507, WESTLAW (“[A] board of
directors should determine the existence of surplus in light of current value of
its assets, which may differ from book value.”); Klang, 702 A.2d at 154 (“It is
unrealistic to hold that a corporation is bound by its balance sheets for
purposes of determining compliance with Section 160.”).
54

55

Id.

56

Id.
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concepts by using this practice problem, working through four
questions, and examining the model answer provided: 57
Problem 1:
Issuer, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Issuer”),
has decided to redeem all of its outstanding Series A
Preferred Stock (the “Series A”). The Series A was
issued three years ago to a single investor, who received
10,000 shares in exchange for $100,000. The preferences
of the Series A state that the Issuer has the option to
redeem all or part of the Series A after two years for a
redemption price of 1.5x the original purchase price.
Pursuant to the Series A’s Certificate of Designations,
Issuer was paying dividends at a rate of 8% per annum
and decided to redeem the Series A in order to avoid
making these continuous payments. The Series A has no
par value. Issuer has 10 million shares of common stock,
par value $0.01 per share, outstanding. Issuer’s board of
directors has not elected to designate any of the
additional consideration received for Issuer’s common
stock as capital. Finally, Issuer has assets of $20 million
and liabilities of $5 million.
Question 1: What is Issuer’s capital?
Issuer has a capital of $200,000. The non-par
value Series A shares adds $100,000, the full
consideration for the shares, to Issuer’s capital account,
following the general rule. Issuer’s common stock adds
an additional $100,000 in capital, since the par value of

This section is not meant necessarily for practitioners, but rather is intended
to provide context for more uninformed readers who are not familiar with the
process for calculating surplus under DGCL § 154. This sample hypothetical is
completely fictional and any resemblance between the facts herein and actual
issuers is unintentional and completely accidental. Note that, in practice, this
analysis is expeditiously more difficult and counsel should seek the advice of
accountants or other specialists concerning the valuation of assets, capital, and
surplus.
57
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each share ($0.01) times the number of outstanding
shares (10 million) equals $100,000.
Question 2: What is Issuer’s net assets?
The Issuer has net assets of $15 million. This is
computed from subtracting the Issuer’s total assets,
brought to current value, of $20 million from Issuer’s
liabilities.
Question 3: What is Issuer’s surplus?
Issuer has a surplus of $4.8 million. Surplus is
the excess of net assets over capital. Issuer has net assets
of $5 million and capital of $200,000. Therefore, Issuer’s
surplus is $4.8 million
Question 4: Can the Issuer legally redeem its Series A
shares under DGCL § 160?
Yes. The total cost of redeeming the stock is 1.5
x the original purchase price ($100,000) of the Series A.
Therefore, the total cost of redeeming the Series A, and
subsequently the funds used, will be $150,000. DGCL §
160 permits an issuer to redeem its preferred shares,
provided that the funds used in the repurchase to not
exceed surplus. In this case, the funds used ($150,000)
do no exceed the corporation’s surplus ($4.8 million).
Therefore, Issuer may legally redeem its Series A shares
under DGCL § 160.
4. Summation
DGCL § 160 protects an issuer’s creditors by prohibiting the
redemption of the issuer’s preferred stock, using funds that could
otherwise be used to compensate creditors, when the capital of the issuer
is impaired. 58 Determining whether a repurchase is permitted under
Delaware law requires the calculation of the “surplus,” “capital,” and
“net assets” of the corporation. 59 Calculating these figures, in practice, is
58

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2010).

59

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2010).
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extensively more tedious and difficult than the example presented here.
Having discussed the application of redemption restrictions found in
DGCL § 160, this Part will now analyze redemption restrictions
recognized under Delaware common law.
C. Delaware Common Law Restrictions
In addition to restrictions imposed by DGCL § 160, Delaware
common law also limits an issuer’s ability to redeem its preferred stock. 60
A common law limitation on redemptions has been recognized in
Delaware for over 100 years. 61 In application, Delaware common law
supplements, rather than complements, the redemption restrictions imposed
under DGCL § 160. 62 This means that Delaware common law operates
as a restriction “independent of, and in addition to, the DGCL's explicit
provisions.” 63
Delaware common law holds that an issuer “cannot purchase its
own shares of stock when the purchase diminishes the ability of the
company to pay its debts, or lessens the security of its creditors.” 64 In
this way, Delaware common law restricts redemptions on the basis of a
cash flow insolvency test, while DGCL § 160 follows, essentially, a
balance-sheet insolvency test. 65 Theoretically, it is possible that certain
TCV VI, L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., No. CV 10164-VCN, 2015 WL
1598045, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal refused, 115 A.3d 1216 (Del.
2015); SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 987 (Del. Ch.
2010), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011) (noting
common law restrictions).
60

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 987 (noting that the Delaware Chancery Court
had recognized the common law redemption restrictions since “at least 1914.”);
In re Int'l Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 359–60 (1914).
61

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 987 (noting that Delaware common law
restrictions act “in addition to the strictures of Section 160.”) (emphasis in
original).

62

63 TCV VI, L.P., 2015 WL 1598045, at *9 (“[T]his Court has recognized
common law restrictions on stock redemptions that are independent of, and in
addition to, the DGCL's explicit provisions.”).

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 987 (quoting In re Int'l Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch.
358, 359–60 (1914)).
64

Id.; Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993)

65
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redemptions would be permitted under DGCL § 160, using a balancesheet solvency test, but would be restricted by Delaware common law,
employing a cash flow insolvency test. 66 Therefore, Delaware common
law restrictions on redemption supplement DGCL § 160’s limitations
and advance the general principle of creditor protection by insuring that
issuers may not redeem stock while insolvent. 67 Issuers must analyze
their situation under both tests when calculating whether they may legally
redeem their securities.
D. The Consequences of Failing to Redeem Preferred Stock
What happens when an issuer fails to redeem its preferred stock
when redemption is required? The result often depends on the language
used in the preferences. Generally, failing to redeem stock when
redemption is required can lead to: (1) lawsuits, (2) the triggering of
penalty provisions, and (3) the triggering of a VRTE.
1. Consequences for Making a Redemption in Violation of DGCL §
160
To begin, this section focuses primarily on issuers who refuse to
redeem their stock when redemption is required. If an issuer were to
determine that a required redemption is prohibited under DGCL § 160,
yet proceeds with the redemption anyway, then the issuer’s board of
directors would face immediate liability under DGCL § 174. 68 DGCL §
174 imposes joint and several liability on directors for the full amount
paid in the redemption for any willful or negligent violations of DGCL §
160. 69 Therefore, issuers who believe that a required redemption would

(noting that an inability to pay debts as they become due is a cash-flow
insolvency test); James D. Honaker and Eric S. Klinger-Wilensky, Dividends,
Redemptions and Stock Purchases, Practical Law Practice Note 1-519-2507, WESTLAW
(noting that DGCL § 160 follows balance sheet insolvency test and Delaware
common law uses a cash flow insolvency test).
This situation implies that a corporation could theoretically have “surplus”
but no cash and an inability to pay debts as they become due.
66

67

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 987.

68

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1998).

69

Id.
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cause the issuer to violate DGCL § 160 should refuse to proceed with
the redemption.
2. Consequences for Failing to Redeem
Failing to effectuate a required redemption can result in
numerous consequences for issuers. First, failing to redeem preferred
stock may cause preferred shareholders to sue. 70 ThoughtWorks, TCV,
and Brevan are three examples of cases where an issuer of preferred stock
was sued in relation to a required redemption. 71 Regardless of whether
the plaintiffs actually succeed, defending lawsuits such as these can be
expensive and burdensome, particularly where the issuer is already
experiencing financial trouble. 72 Lawsuits can seek declaratory judgment
concerning the existence of a surplus, monetary judgment for the
amount owed from the redemption, or assert breach of contract claims. 73
A creative litigator could state several different causes of action,
including those not present in ThoughtWorks, TCV, or Brevan. 74 As
detailed below, well-advised issuers can limit the effectiveness of these
lawsuits by adding language to the preferences of their preferred stock
that limit their liability.
See cases cited supra notes 14–16 (citing lawsuits where the issuer was sued for
not redeeming its preferred stock).
70

71

Id.

Lawsuit expense can be a particular problem in this context since issuers who
are legally prohibited from redeeming their stock under DGCL § 160 or
Delaware common law are more than likely insolvent. See supra note 64–65 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, there is always the possibility that litigation
resulting from an issuer’s failure to redeem could deter future investors or
creditors from providing capital to the issuer.
72

This is particularly troublesome, since preferred stock preferences are
considered a part of the certificate of incorporation, and the certificate of
incorporation is “viewed as a contract among shareholders . . . .” SV Inv.
Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 983 (Del. Ch. 2010), judgment
entered, (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011); Matulich v. Aegis
Commc'ns Grp., Inc., 942 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 2008). Therefore, violating a
redemption provision contained in a certificate of incorporation or certificate
of designations of a series of preferred stock can be equated to breaching a
contract.

73

74

See cases cited supra notes 14–16.
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Second, an issuer’s failure to redeem may result in penalties. 75
Preferred shareholders who have call rights (the ability to have the issuer
redeem their shares at the option of the investor) may insist on the
insertion of penalty provisions that would take effect if the preferred
stock is not redeemed when the preferred shareholder calls for
redemption. 76 For example, a penalty provision may provide that where
the issuer is unable to effectuate a redemption, the issuer must pay
interest on the outstanding amount required for the redemption. 77
Finally, an issuer’s failure to redeem may constitute a VRTE. In
this context, a VRTE provides extraordinary voting rights to the
unredeemed preferred stockholders. 78 For example, unredeemed holders
of a class of stock may be allowed, under a VRTE provision, to elect a
majority of issuer’s board of directors until the redemption amount is
paid in full. 79 The triggering of a VRTE and the consequences of a
VRTE vary depending on the language of the provision. However,
failing to redeem a series of preferred stock when redemption is required
may result in the triggering of VRTE provisions, as well as board
turnover that could follow. 80 Having explained, broadly, the possible
consequences of an issuer’s failure to redeem its preferred stock, we may
now turn to Part II.

See infra note 134 and accompanying text (noting the presence of a penalty
provision in TCV).
75

76

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 978–79.

Penalty provisions like this example are often found in debt securities. Craig
H. Averch et al., The Right of Oversecured Creditors to Default Rates of Interest from A
Debtor in Bankruptcy, 47 BUS. LAW. 961, 964 (1992) (noting that “provisions for
reasonable default rates of interest are enforceable.”).
77

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 978–79 (providing the sample VRTE where the
unredeemed preferred shareholders are allowed to elect a majority of the
issuer’s board until the redemption is effectuated); Brevan Howard Credit
Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 9209-VCG,
2014 WL 2943570, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014) (discussing VRTE).
78

79

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 978–79.

80

Brevan, 2014 WL 2943570, at *7–8.
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PART II: THOUGHTWORKS, TCV, & BREVAN

Having discussed the theory, mechanics, and impact of
redemption restrictions in Part I, Part II analyzes the way these
restrictions have been applied and interpreted in Delaware courts.
Specifically, Part II will examine three opinions issued by the Delaware
Chancery Court within the past six years: ThoughtWorks, TCV, and
Brevan. While ThoughtWorks is the seminal case in this area, TCV and
Brevan are unpublished opinions and do not represent final adjudications
of the disputes at issue in the cases. 81 Nevertheless, the logic and
process the Delaware Chancery Court employs in evaluating the issues
presented in TCV and Brevan makes analysis of the decisions valuable. 82
Since ThoughtWorks provides the most authoritative discussion of
redemption restrictions, the analysis begins there.
A. ThoughtWorks, Inc.
1. Facts
In ThoughtWorks, a group of affiliated investment funds and their
advisor, SV Investment Partners (collectively “SVIP”), brought an action
against the defendant, ThoughtWorks, Inc. (“ThoughtWorks”), 83 an
information technology firm. 84 In 1999, six years after ThoughtWorks’
incorporation, ThoughtWorks began seeking a $25 million private equity
investment in their business. 85 SVIP received the offering memorandum

TCV VI, L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., No. CV 10164-VCN, 2015 WL
1598045, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal refused, 115 A.3d 1216 (Del.
2015); Brevan, 2014 WL 2943570, at *1. TCV involves the Delaware Chancery
Court’s decision concerning plaintiff’s motion of judgment on the pleadings,
while Brevan involves the court’s decision concerning a motion to dismiss. Id.
81

TCV and Brevan also allow drafters to evaluate the way Delaware courts may
handle issues that were not presented in ThoughtWorks. For example,
ThoughtWorks does not mention VRTEs, but Brevan does.
82

83

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 981.

84

Id. at 977.

Id. ThoughtWorks board believed that finding a major private investor
would make the company more attractive to investors when it went public. Id.
85
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circulated by ThoughtWorks, approached the company, and began
negotiating the terms of an investment. 86
In negotiations, SVIP and ThoughtWorks anticipated that
ThoughtWorks would go public via an IPO within a year or two. 87
Despite this presumption, SVIP negotiated a mandatory redemption
right, triggering five years after the issuance of SVIP’s preferred stock, in
Ultimately, SVIP
case the anticipated IPO never materialized. 88
purchased 2,970,917 shares of ThoughtWorks’ Series A preferred stock
in exchange for an investment of $26.6 million. 89
Two years after SVIP made their investment, the “dot com”
bubble burst, scuttling ThoughtWorks’ plans of making an IPO. 90 In
2003, with redemption looming, ThoughtWorks alerted SVIP that it
would be unable to satisfy its redemption obligations. 91 In response,
SVIP agreed to postpone the redemption until July 2005 to give
ThoughtWorks time to seek outside financing for the redemption. 92
ThoughtWorks’ attempts to secure outside financing failed and, on May
19-20, 2005, SVIP exercised their redemption right. 93
On July 1, 2015, two days before the redemption was due,
ThoughtWorks’ board of directors convened to discuss SVIP’s
redemption demand. 94 ThoughtWorks’ board concluded that it lacked
the funds necessary to redeem SVIP’s preferred stock and thus declined
to make any redemption. 95 SVIP disagreed and filed a declaratory
judgment action. 96
The Delaware Chancery Court held that
86

Id. at 978.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id. at 979.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id. at 979–80.

96

Id. at 980.
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ThoughtWorks had the legal obligation to redeem SVIP’s preferred
stock “to the extent funds are legally available therefor[e].” 97
After this ruling, SVIP re-invoked their redemption rights. 98
ThoughtWorks’ board met again to analyze whether ThoughtWorks had
any “funds legally available” to use in the redemption. 99 The board
determined that ThoughtWorks had $500,000 legally available to use in
the redemption and thus redeemed $500,000 worth of SVIP’s preferred
stock. 100 ThoughtWorks’ board continued this process of evaluation and
redemption for four years, ultimately redeeming a total of $4.1 million
worth of SVIP’s preferred stock. 101 Despite this, in February 2007, SVIP
filed an action against ThoughtWorks, seeking declaratory judgment as
to the meaning of the phrase “funds legally available” and “a monetary
judgment for the lesser of (i) the full amount of ThoughtWorks’
redemption obligation and (ii) the full amount of ThoughtWorks’ ‘funds
legally available.’” 102
2. Issues
The Delaware Chancery Court, in applying DGCL § 160 to the
SVIP’s redemption claim, faced two major issues:
1. Whether the term “funds legally available” is synonymous
with “surplus.” 103
2. What standard will Delaware courts use when reviewing a
board of directors’ calculation of surplus? 104

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 981.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 983–84.

104

Id. at 988.
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3. Analysis
The Delaware Chancery Court, in applying DGCL § 160 to
SVIP’s redemption demand, held that the phrase “funds legally
available,” as used in the preferences of ThoughtWorks’ Series A
preferred stock, is not synonymous with “surplus” as defined by
DGCL § 154. 105 This holding shocked many, since drafting conventions
at the time widely interpreted “funds legally available” and “surplus” as
synonymous. 106 In coming to this conclusion, the Delaware Chancery
Court reasoned that a corporation could lack “funds” and yet have the
capacity to make redemptions or pay dividends out of its surplus using
other corporate property. 107 “Funds legally available,” according to the
ThoughtWorks Court, means “‘funds’ (in the sense of cash) that are
‘available’ (in the sense of on hand or readily accessible through sales or
borrowing) and can be deployed ‘legally’ for redemptions without
violating Section 160 or other statutory or common law provisions.” 108
Since SVIP’s claims were predicated on the idea that “funds legally
available” was synonymous with “surplus,” SVIP’s claims failed and the
court refused to require ThoughtWorks to redeem additional shares of
its preferred stock. 109
In addition, the ThoughtWorks Court endorsed the Delaware
Supreme Court’s ruling in Klang that an issuer’s board of directors is
granted deference when it comes to valuing assets for the purpose of
calculating “surplus.” 110 Under ThoughtWorks, when an issuer’s board
decides on the amount of surplus available to make redemptions, its
decision is entitled to deference absent a showing that the board: (1)
acted in bad faith, (2) relied on unreliable methods and data, or (3) made

105

Id. at 983 (“The two concepts, however, are not equivalent.”).

Id. (noting that the phrase “funds legally available” was “colloquially treated
as if synonymous with ‘surplus.’”).

106

107

Id. at 984; see Alcott v. Hyman, 208 A.2d 501, 508 (Del. 1965).

108

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 988.

109

Id.

110 Id. at 988; Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 154–
56 (Del. 1997).
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determinations so far off the mark as to constitute actual or constructive
fraud. 111
4. Takeaways from ThoughtWorks.
Issuers can learn many lessons from ThoughtWorks, including:
1. “Funds legally available” is not synonymous with
“surplus.” After ThoughtWorks, “funds legally available” will no
longer be construed as being synonymous with “surplus.” 112
After ThoughtWorks, incorporating the phrase “funds legally
available” in redemption provisions may be technically
unnecessary, since ThoughtWorks states that where terms such as
“funds legally available” are omitted, “a comparable limitation
would be implied by law.” 113
2. The use of mandatory redemption provisions and put rights
should be avoided if possible. If the redemption provision in
ThoughtWorks functioned as a call right, a discretionary
redemption at the option of the issuer, rather than a mandatory
redemption or discretionary put right, then ThoughtWorks could
have avoided litigation completely, since the company would
have had no legal duty to repurchase its shares.
3. Valuation Provisions will not overrule board discretion in
valuing assets. A valuation provision may require that an issuer
value its assets at the highest amount possible under applicable
law. However, as ThoughtWorks makes clear, a valuation

111 ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 988 (“Rather, the plaintiff must prove that in
determining the amount of funds legally available, the board acted in bad faith,
relied on methods and data that were unreliable, or made a determination so far
off the mark as to constitute actual or constructive fraud.”).
112

Id. at 983 (“The two concepts, however, are not equivalent.”).

Id. at 990. Note, however, that the court’s statement, both in Klang and in
ThoughtWorks, that a limitation that is similar to “funds legally available” will be
implied may be inconsistent with “a line of precedent [that] holds that
preferences claimed by preferred stockholders must be clearly set forth in a
certificate of incorporation or designation and will not be presumed or by the
court.” Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 A.3d 928, 936 (Del. Ch.
2012).

113
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provision “does not eliminate the need for judgment . . . .” 114
Part III makes suggestions for drafting valuation provisions in
light of this precedent.
4. Provide for pro rata redemption in the preferences of
redeemable preferred stock. ThoughtWorks’ board provided,
in the preferences of its Series A preferred stock, for a
contingency where ThoughtWorks lacked sufficient funds to pay
for the redemption. 115 By providing that payments would be
made pro rata until the redemption was effectuated,
ThoughtWorks’ board reduced its chances of being sued or held
liable for breach of contract. 116 Language such as this is highly
advisable, as discussed in Part III.
5. Avoid 100% Redemptions.
ThoughtWorks’ redemption
provision required it to redeem “not less than 100%” of the
plaintiff’s preferred stock if they made a redemption demand
after 5 years. 117
It is advisable to replace this “100%”
requirement with language such as “to the extent allowed by
law.” This allows the issuer to completely redeem the preferred
shareholder if it has the funds, and to partially redeem the

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 988; see supra notes 65–66 and accompanying
text. A corporation could have no “funds legally available” yet be able to make
a redemption using corporate property. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 984.

114

115

Id. at 978–79.

ThoughtWorks reduced its chances of being sued for breach of contract by
providing, in its charter, for procedures that were to be followed if the required
redemption was not made. Since “[a] certificate of incorporation is viewed as a
contract among shareholders, and general rules of contract interpretation apply
to its terms[,]” ThoughtWorks could not be sued for following the terms of the
contract, thus making the pro rata redemption. Matulich v. Aegis Commc'ns
Essar Invs., Ltd., 942 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 2008) (“The rules of construction
which are used to interpret contracts and other written instruments are
applicable when construing corporate charters and certificates of designation.”);
Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134 (Del. 1990).

116

117

Id. at 978.
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preferred shareholder, with less cause for liability, if it lacks the
funds. 118
Having discussed the facts, issues, analysis, and practitioner
takeaways from ThoughtWorks, Part II now turns to the Delaware
Chancery Court’s decision in TCV.
B. TCV
1. Facts
TradingScreen was a company that provided electronic securities
trading services. 119 The plaintiffs in TCV were preferred stockholders of
TradingScreen who had purchased Series D preferred stock in the
company. 120 Section 7 of TradingScreen’s Certificate of Incorporation
made the Series D preferred stock redeemable if, after 5 years had
passed, no other buyers for the preferred shares could be found. 121 Five
years after purchasing the Series D preferred stock, the plaintiffs
exercised their redemption rights pursuant to TradingScreen’s charter. 122
TradingScreen, like ThoughtWorks, lacked the funds needed to
fully redeem its Series D preferred stock. 123 TradingScreen’s board of
directors determined that only $7.2 million was available to use in the
redemption. 124 TradingScreen offered to make pro rata redemptions
Absent language that allows partial redemptions, or pro rata, redemptions, a
cause of action for breach of contract may arise if the full redemption amount
is not paid, depending on the language of the provision. See Brevan Howard
Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 9209VCG, 2014 WL 2943570, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014) (holding that breach
of contract claim was adequately pleaded where no pro rata or partial
redemption language was included in the preferences).
118

119

See supra note 11.

TCV VI, L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., No. CV 10164-VCN, 2015 WL
1598045, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal refused, 115 A.3d 1216 (Del.
2015).

120

121

Id.

122

Id. at *2.

123

Id.

124

Id.
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125

until the balance of the redemption was paid.
The plaintiffs rejected
the board’s offer, demanded immediate payment, threatened suit unless
payment was made, and claimed that failure to redeem their preferred
stock constituted a “default” under TradingScreen’s charter. 126 Any
default would cause unpaid payments to incur interest in the amount of
13% per annum. 127
Plaintiffs brought suit, claiming, among other things, that
TradingScreen’s failure to redeem its preferred stock constituted a
violation of TradingScreen’s charter and that interest on any unpaid
amounts was required. 128 The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings on these two claims. 129
2. Issues
TCV:

The Delaware Chancery Court resolved two primary issues in
1. Whether Delaware common law prohibits redemption where an
issuer has sufficient surplus to make a redemption under DGCL
§ 160, yet would be rendered balance-sheet insolvent as a result
of the redemption.
2. Whether a penalty provision, such as the interest provision
presented in TCV, is enforceable where an issuer is unable to
redeem its preferred stock.
3. Analysis
The Delaware Chancery Court, in an unpublished opinion, held
that where a corporation has sufficient surplus under a balance sheet
Id. It is notable that TCV’s board offered to make pro rata redemptions, but
there was no explicit language in TCV’s charter that required pro rata
redemptions in the event that TCV lacked funds needed to make the
redemption. Id. Had this language been present, it is possible that TCV may
have avoided suit for breach of contract altogether.
125

126

Id. at *3.

127

Id.

128

Id. at *3.

129

Id.
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insolvency test, redemption is still prohibited if the redemption would
cause the issuer to be unable to operate as a going concern. 130 Therefore,
if a redemption would make an issuer cash flow insolvent, redemption is
prohibited. 131 Since redemption could not be made under Delaware
common law, the TCV Court refused to grant judgment on the
pleadings for plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, 132 reasoning that there
was no legal obligation for TCV to make the redemption in
contravention of Delaware common law. 133
Furthermore, in TCV, the Delaware court refused to enforce a
“penalty provision” providing for interest payments in the amount of
13% in the event of a default on payments. 134 The TCV Court held that
TradingScreen never defaulted on a contractual duty, since, even though
there was no clause in the redemption provision requiring that
redemption be made out of legal funds, Delaware courts imply such a

Id. at *6 (“TradingScreen may only ‘legally’ deploy funds for stock
redemptions if doing so does not ‘violat[e] Section 160 or other statutory or
common law restrictions, including the requirement that the corporation be
able to continue as a going concern and not be rendered insolvent by the
distribution.’”) (quoting SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d
973, 988 (Del. Ch. 2010), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd, 37 A.3d 205
(Del. 2011)).
130

Id. This result could have been predicted from the text of ThoughtWorks. See
supra notes 51–66 and accompanying text.

131

Id. at * 7 (“Plaintiffs' motion must be denied as to their breach of contract
claim under Count I because (i) the common law restricts TradingScreen's
ability to redeem its shares when doing so would damage its ability to continue
as a going concern and (ii) the Special Committee undertook a facially valid
process finding that a full redemption would impair TradingScreen's continuing
viability.”).
132

133

Id. at *7–8.

134

Id. at *8.
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135

limitation by law.
Where there was no default, there could be no
penalty, so the plaintiffs were not entitled to interest payments. 136
4. Takeaways from TCV
TCV provides issuers an unprecedented insight into the way
Delaware courts may apply DGCL § 160 and the precedent of
ThoughtWorks. Specifically, TCV shows issuers several things:
1. Common law must be considered. In TCV, while the actual
numbers are redacted, it appears that TradingScreen had
adequate surplus to effectuate the redemption. 137 However, the
Delaware Chancery Court refused to require TradingScreen to
redeem further shares of its stock, on the theory that doing so
would render TradingScreen cash-flow insolvent, in violation of
Delaware common law. 138
2. Even if omitted, Delaware courts may imply certain
language. Where an issuer omits language such as “funds
legally available” or “consistently with Delaware law,” TCV and
ThoughtWorks indicate that the language will be implied. 139 It
does not appear that Delaware courts will allow an issuer or
preferred stockholder to draft around the restrictions of DGCL §
160 and Delaware common law. 140 Redemptions must be
effectuated consistently with Delaware law.

135 Id. at *5 (“TradingScreen's Charter, unlike ThoughtWorks's, does not
explicitly restrict redemptions to those that can be made out of ‘funds legally
available.’ However, in ThoughtWorks, this Court noted that were such language
omitted from a corporation's charter, ‘a comparable limitation would be implied
by law.’”) (quoting ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 990).
136

Id. at *8.

Id. at *5 (“Plaintiffs argue that TradingScreen's net asset value is at least
$[redacted] million, and after deducting for the par value of issued stock, the
Company's statutory surplus is more than sufficient to redeem their shares.”).
137

138

Id. at *5–6.

139

Id. at *5.

TCV VI, L.P., 2015 WL 1598045, at *6 (“while Delaware stockholders ‘may
by contract embody in the charter a provision departing from the [default] rules
of the common law,’ they are not permitted to ‘transgress . . . a public policy
140
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3. Failure to redeem does not necessarily equal default. The
language of the penalty provision will control whether the
penalty applies, but TCV makes it clear that penalty provisions
that trigger merely upon “default” may not trigger due to an
issuer’s failure to redeem. 141 This is due, in part, to the fact that
where the language of the redemption provision does not
provide that redemption may only be effectuated in accordance
with Delaware law, then courts will imply such limitation by
law. 142
As noted previously, TCV is unpublished. However, drafters
can still learn from the logic and process used by the Delaware Chancery
Court in resolving the issues presented in TCV, as evidenced by the
takeaway points listed above. Part III now turns to the final case, Brevan.
C. Brevan
1. Facts
In Brevan, Spanish Broadcasting System (“SBS”) issued Series B
Preferred Stock (“the Series B”) to the plaintiffs, a series of funds. 143
The preferences of the Series B resulted in the Series B functioning
similarly to debt. 144 The Series B was redeemable, under certain
conditions, at the option of both SBS and the holder. 145 The preferences
of the Series B further provided that if “the Company fails to discharge
any redemption or repurchase obligation with respect to the Series B

settled by the common law or implicit in the General Corporation Law itself.’”)
(quoting Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952).
Id. at *8. This may vary depending on the language used and the document’s
definition of “default.”
141

142

Id. at *5.

Brevan Howard Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys.,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 9209-VCG, 2014 WL 2943570, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014).

143

Id. at *2. For example, the preferences required SBS to pay a dividend
quarterly, much like interest payments. Id.

144

145

Id.
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Preferred Stock . . .” then a VRTE occurs and the holders of the Series B
receive the right to fill seats on SBS’ board of directors. 146
On October 15, 2013, the holders of almost all of the Series B
shares invoked their redemption rights. 147 SBS redeemed a small number
of the outstanding Series B, and then claimed that it lacked funds to
redeem any additional shares. 148 SBS further acknowledged that its
failure to redeem triggered a VRTE. 149 The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging
that SBS breached Section 7 of the Series B Certificate of Designations
in two ways: (1) that SBS failed to comply with a clause that required
SBS to take “all actions that could generate funds to repurchase the
Series B” (hereafter the “all action” clause), 150 and (2) that SBS failed to
assess what legally available funds may be raised by actions such as
selling assets or issuing additional equity. 151
In response, SBS argued that it was prohibited from taking
certain actions to acquire financing with which to repurchase the Series B
due to an indenture governing a previous debt offering the company
executed. 152 SBS basically argued that, despite the language in the
preferences requiring it to take “all actions” that could generate funds,
certain activities were nonetheless prohibited, such as certain sales of
assets. 153 Consequently, SBS moved to dismiss Count III of the
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which alleged “breach of contract based

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150 Id. (“First, the Plaintiffs read the second sentence of subsection (g)—that
‘[t]he Company shall take all actions required or permitted under the DGCL to
permit any repurchase—as creating an obligation on the part of the Company
to take all actions that could generate funds to repurchase the Series B . . . .’”).

Id. (“Second, the Plaintiffs contend that, even if SBS's obligation under
subsection (g) is limited to the use of ‘legally available funds,’ that
understanding itself implies an obligation on the part of the Company to assess
what legally available funds may be raised . . . .”).
151

152

Id. at *3.

153

Id. at *2–3.
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on the Company's failure to meet its obligations under Section 7 of the
Certificate, governing repurchase of the Plaintiffs' Series B shares.” 154
2. Issues
Brevan:

The Delaware Chancery Court resolved three primary issues in

1. Whether an “all action” clause included in a redemption
provision requires issuers to take all possible actions that would
result in generating legally available funds from which SBS could
satisfy its repurchase obligations.
2. Does the phrase “funds legally available” also include funds
“readily accessible through sales or borrowing?”
3. Whether an issuer’s failure to redeem preferred stock may trigger
a VRTE.
3. Analysis
At the heart of the first issue posed in Brevan is Section 7(g) of
the Series B Certificate of Designations, which states: “(g) No Series B
Preferred Stock may be repurchased except with funds legally available
for the purpose. The Company shall take all actions required or
permitted under the DGCL to permit any repurchase pursuant to this
Section 7.” 155 The plaintiffs argued that the phrase “the Company shall
take all actions . . . permitted under the DGCL” obligated SBS to take all
possible actions that would result in generating legally available funds
from which SBS could satisfy its repurchase obligations, so long as those
actions were not prohibited by the DGCL. 156 The defendants, however,
argued instead that Section 7(g) merely required SBS to “take the
necessary steps established by the DGCL for a Delaware corporation to
repurchase shares.” 157

Id. at *3. For purposes of this Article, analysis of the defendant’s claim that
plaintiff’s lacked standing is omitted.

154

155

Id. at *5.

156

Id.

157

Id.
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Ultimately, the Delaware Chancery Court held in favor of SBS,
finding the plaintiff’s interpretation “unreasonable.” 158 In coming to this
conclusion, the Brevan Court analyzed parallel language found in Section
6 of the Series B Certificate of Designations, involving redemption at
SBS’s option. 159 When Section 6 was read together with Section 7, the
Court reasoned that:
[T]he only reasonable interpretation of
[the no action clause in Section 7(g)] is
that the parties intended to require the
Company, if it elects to redeem shares, to
accomplish such a redemption in
compliance with the DGCL. Similarly, the
only reasonable interpretation of the
parallel language under Section 7 is that,
when considering repurchase requests on
behalf of the Series B holders, the
Company must accomplish whatever
repurchases it makes in compliance with
the DGCL, and must do so only with
legally available funds. 160
Therefore, under Brevan, an “all action” clause does not require an issuer
to take all actions possible to raise legally available funds. 161 Instead, an
“all action” clause simply requires issuers to take the necessary steps
established by the DGCL for a Delaware corporation to repurchase
shares. 162 Despite this ruling, the Brevan Court held that the plaintiffs
adequately plead a breach of contract claim against SBS and denied SBS’
motion to dismiss. 163
As for the second issue, SBS conceded that “funds legally
available” does not consist solely of cash on hand but also of funds
158

Id.

159

Id. at *6.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id. at *8.
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164

“readily accessible through sales or borrowing.”
Furthermore, the
court resolved the third issue by holding that SBS’ failure to redeem all
of its Series B constituted a VRTE. 165
4. Takeaways from Brevan
In addition to the lessons provided by ThoughtWorks and TCV,
Brevan provides new insights, such as:
1. VRTEs may be enforced if an issuer fails to redeem. While
the TCV Court refused to enforce a penalty provision, it was
conceded in Brevan that SBS’ failure to redeem resulted in a
VRTE. 166 However, this may vary depending on the language of
the provision.
2. “All action” clauses are narrowly construed. “All action”
clauses simply require issuers to take the necessary steps
established by the DGCL for a Delaware corporation to
repurchase shares. 167 However, as discussed infra, clauses that
require issuers to take certain, specific actions to raise funds
needed to make a redemption (hereafter “Specific Action
clauses”) may be enforced due to the contractual nature of
preferred stock preferences. 168
3. “Funds legally available” includes funds readily accessible
through sales or borrowing. When calculating surplus and
available funds to be used in a redemption, an issuer’s board of
Id. at *6 (“legally available funds do not consist solely of available cash, but
also of funds readily accessible through sales or borrowing”) (internal citation
omitted).

164

Id. at *7 (noting that failure to redeem the Series B Preferred
“unquestionably results in a VRTE”).

165

166

Id.

167

Id.

Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134 (Del. 1990) (noting that Charter
provisions constitute a contract among shareholders); Matulich v. Aegis
Commc’ns. Grp., Inc., 942 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 2008) (“The rules of
construction which are used to interpret contracts and other written
instruments are applicable when construing corporate charters and certificates
of designation.”).
168
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directors must not only confine their analysis to merely cash on
hand, but also analyze funds that could be accessed through
selling assets or borrowing. 169
Having completed analysis of the facts, issues, holdings, and
takeaways of ThoughtWorks, TCV, and Brevan, we turn now to Part III, a
series of drafting recommendations and practices designed to help
issuers both avoid and prevail at litigation resulting from an
uneffectuated redemption.
PART III: DRAFTING RECOMMENDATIONS & SUGGESTED PRACTICES

Having reviewed Delaware law restricting preferred stock
redemptions in Part I and cases where issuers were sued for failing to
redeem their preferred stock in Part II, a question remains—is a change
in drafting practices really necessary? After all, ThoughtWorks and TCV
are pro-issuer decisions. 170 However, Brevan shows that a plaintiff may
properly plead a claim for breach of contract against an issuer as a result
of the issuer’s failure to redeem its preferred stock. 171 This indicates that
changes are necessary.
Beyond Brevan, additional Delaware cases, such as Shiftan v.
Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., suggest that contemporary drafting practices
require revision. 172 For example, under Shiftan, it is arguable that
protection provided to issuers by the ThoughtWorks and TCV Courts’
SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 988 (Del.
Ch.2010), aff'd, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011) (noting that funds are “‘available’ (in
the sense of on hand or readily accessible through sales or borrowing) . . .”) (emphasis
added).

169

In ThoughtWorks and TCV, the defendant issuers prevailed. See cases cited
supra notes 109, 133, 136 and accompanying text.

170

171 Brevan, 2014 WL 2943570, at *8. The Brevan Court held that the plaintiff
properly pled a breach of contract claim, even though DGCL § 160 and
Delaware common law prohibited the issuer from making the redemption. Id.

Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 A.3d 928, 933 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(holding that where a mandatory redemption was not premised on the existence
of “funds legally available” there nevertheless existed a “an unconditional
obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock, subject only to the statutory
capital requirements imposed by 8 Del. C. § 160.”).

172
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implication of limitations similar to “funds legally available,” even where
such language is absent from the preferences, is inconsistent with “a line
of precedent hold[ing] that preferences claimed by preferred
stockholders must be clearly set forth in a certificate of incorporation or
designation and will not be presumed or implied by the court.” 173
Furthermore, issuers must ask themselves whether protection by
implication is sufficient to safeguard their interests. 174 To be safe,
contemporary drafters must not rely exclusively on protection by
implication but rather on protections explicitly incorporated into their
redemption provisions.
In addition, the idea that “contracts are to be interpreted as
written, and effect must be given to their clear and unambiguous terms”
may result in liability for issuers where the preferences of the preferred
stock state that if redemption is not made, then the issuer is liable,
regardless of whether the redemption is legally impossible. 175 It is
conceivable that Delaware courts, as a matter of public policy, will not
enforce such a provision. 176 However, the Delaware Chancery Court
held that the plaintiffs in Brevan adequately plead a case of breach of
contract, even where SBS claimed that it lacked funds and could not
effectuate a redemption consistently with Delaware law. 177 Therefore, to

173

Id. at 936 (emphasis added).

TCV VI, L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., No. CV 10164-VCN, 2015 WL
1598045, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal refused, 115 A.3d 1216 (Del.
2015). In referencing protection by implication, this Part is referencing
protection in the form of implied limitations similar to the phrase “funds legally
available.” Id. This Article advocates that rather than relying on courts to
imply protections against liability for non-redemption of preferred stock,
issuers should supply their own protection in the preferences.

174

Id. As an example of this, the Delaware Chancery Court did not challenge
SBS’ concession in Brevan that non-redemption was a VRTE, even though
redemption was impossible under Delaware common law. Brevan, 2014 WL
2943570, at *7. This argument applies to penalty provisions and VRTEs as well
as breach of contract liability.

175

TCV VI, L.P., 2015 WL 1598045, at *6; Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952).

176

177

Brevan, 2014 WL 2943570, at *8.
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ensure protection from liability, changes in drafting practices are
necessary.
By following the suggested practices listed in this Part, issuers
can (1) minimize, to the greatest extent possible, their potential liabilities
for failing to redeem preferred stock; and (2) maximize their chances of
being able to redeem their preferred stock when necessary, thus avoiding
liability altogether. By minimizing liability and maximizing the issuers’
ability to redeem its preferred stock, issuers can save time, money, and
human resources. The following are suggested practices for issuers, to
be discussed individually in detail:
1. Eliminate mandatory redemptions and discretionary put
rights altogether. Instead, when possible, use call rights. If
you must include mandatory redemption provisions or
discretionary put rights, include language that redemption is
not required where redemption is “prohibited by law.”
2. Draft with specificity. Provide, in the preferences of the
preferred stock, for pro rata redemption in the event that
Delaware law restricts or prohibits a complete redemption.
Issuers may also desire to circumvent valuation challenges by
establishing a valuation methodology for valuing the issuer’s
net assets before issuing its preferred stock.
3. Avoid negative drafting. Where possible, do not include
VRTEs, penalty provisions, or “specific action” clauses that
require the company to seek financing from particular
sources when calculating and gathering funds for the
redemption. If you must include penalty provisions or
VRTEs, attempt to structure the triggers so they will not
apply where redemption is forbidden under DGCL § 160 or
Delaware common law.
A. Eliminating Mandatory Redemption Rights and Discretionary Put Rights;
Excuse Redemptions “Prohibited by Law”
To begin, ThoughtWorks, TCV, and Brevan share one common
characteristic—the preferences of each issuer’s preferred stock contained
mandatory redemption rights that obligated the issuers to redeem the
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preferred shareholders under conditions outside of the issuer’s control. 178
Whenever an issuer relinquishes control over the timing or occurrence of
a redemption, the threat emerges that redemption rights may trigger at
an inopportune time where the issuer lacks funds to effectuate the
redemption. 179 By replacing mandatory redemption provisions and
discretionary put rights with call rights, issuers eliminate the threat of
lawsuits before they even begin. 180 If an issuer uses call rights, then
preferred shareholders would not be able to sue the issuer for failing to
redeem its stock, since the issuer had the right, but not the obligation, to
redeem. Therefore, the easiest way for issuers to avoid liability is to stop
using mandatory redemptions and discretionary put rights altogether.
Unfortunately, issuers will not always be able to control whether
a mandatory or discretionary redemption is included in the preferences
of their preferred stock. 181 In ThoughtWorks, for example, the plaintiffs—
preferred stockholders—negotiated the mandatory put provision as a
contingency in case an initial public offering was not executed. 182 In fact,
an issuer’s refusal to include a mandatory redemption provision may hurt

178

See supra notes 88, 121, 145 and accompanying text.

It is impossible for an issuer to know, with precise certainty, that they will
have sufficient surplus in the future to effectuate redemption when required.
Of course, well-capitalized issuers have far less risk than issuers who are in
financial distress. Apple, Inc., for example, does not have to worry about
insolvency from a practical standpoint and thus can draft redemption
provisions with little risk. However, an issuer drifting on the edge of
insolvency must consider the possibility that it will be unable to redeem its
preferred shares before issuing additional redeemable equity.
179

For example, if the preferred stock in ThoughtWorks was redeemable at the
option of the issuer, then ThoughtWorks could have evaluated its surplus in
2005, determined that it could not redeem the preferred stock, and avoided the
lawsuit altogether, since it would have had no legal duty to redeem.

180

In negotiating, an investors’ desire for a definitive exit strategy via a
mandatory redemption may lead issuers to concede to a mandatory redemption
or discretionary put right. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory
of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1865 (2013) (noting that with venture
capital, “exit via mandatory redemption is hardwired into the business model.”).
181

SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 978 (Del. Ch.
2010), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011).

182
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183

the marketability of its preferred stock.
The question remains, how
can an issuer reduce its liability where it has no other option but to
include a mandatory redemption or put right in the preferences of its
preferred stock?
Simply inserting a clause into the redemption provision that
states that redemption is not required if Delaware law prohibits the
redemption solves this problem. 184 Due to contractual nature of
preferred stock in Delaware, if the issuer’s charter or the certificate of
designations for the preferred stock says that the preferred stock cannot
be redeemed if the redemption would violate Delaware law, then
Delaware courts will likely enforce such a provision. 185 In addition,
preferred stockholders would be precluded from bringing a breach of
contract lawsuit against the issuer in such a situation because redemption
would not be required by the express terms of the contract (the
certificate or charter). 186 Consequently, an issuer can drastically reduce

Some prospective purchasers may treat preferred stock closely to debt and
insist on a mandatory redemption as akin to a maturity date. See Brevan
Howard Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No.
CIV.A. 9209-VCG, 2014 WL 2943570, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014) (noting
that “the Series B preferred also function like debt instruments by providing
what may be likened to a maturation date.”); William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1865 (2013)
(noting that mandatory redemption is endemic to some investor’s business
models).

183

This language has also been suggested as a replacement for the phrase
“funds legally available.” C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett, Delaware
Insider: Drafting A Mandatory Put Provision for Preferred Stock After ThoughtWorks,
BUS. L. TODAY, January 2012, at 1, 3.
184

Matulich v. Aegis Commc’ns. Grp., Inc., 942 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 2008)
(“The rules of construction which are used to interpret contracts and other
written instruments are applicable when construing corporate charters and
certificates of designation.”); SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7
A.3d 973, 987 (Del. Ch. 2010), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd, 37 A.3d
205 (Del. 2011).
185

Matulich, 942 A.2d at 600. This assumes that the issuer’s board adequately
values surplus and follows the requirements of DGCL § 160. For example, a
preferred shareholder may be able to sue for breach of contract if the issuer’s
board of directors value assets in a way that is inconsistent with the Delaware
Supreme Court’s holding in Klang. Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers,

186
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its liability by avoiding mandatory redemptions and put rights altogether
and, when necessary, adding language that states that redemption is not
required if prohibited by law.
B. Draft with Specificity; Think of the End from the Beginning
ThoughtWorks, TCV, and Brevan show that issuers sometimes fail
to contemplate the way courts interpret redemption rights where
redemption is impossible. 187 To minimize liability, issuers must carefully
draft the preferences of their preferred stock with redemption
restrictions in mind. In particular, an issuer can minimize its liability by
providing, in the preferences of their preferred stock, for (1) pro rata
redemption, to the extent of surplus or cash available, where a complete
redemption cannot be effectuated; and (2) a valuation methodology to be
used for valuing the issuer’s net assets while calculating surplus.
First, in the event that a complete redemption is forbidden by
DGCL § 160 or Delaware common law, providing for pro rata
redemption helps issuers avoid breach of contract claims. 188 Pro rata
redemption allows preferred stockholders to be paid to the extent
permitted by law. 189 A pro rata redemption clause will likely be
enforced, 190 and could be used by courts as a basis for dismissing a
breach of contract claim, since the preferences of a preferred stock, and
thus the pro rata redemption clause, constitute a contract among
shareholders. 191
Pro rata redemption can, and likely should, be used in
conjunction with Part III(a)’s suggestion that the language “prohibited
Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 152 (Del. 1997) (discussing appropriate methodologies for
valuing a corporation’s assets).
187

See cases cited supra notes 88, 121, 145 and accompanying text.

For example, ThoughtWorks’ preferred stock preferences included a prorata redemption clause. See cases cited supra note 115 and accompanying text.
They were not sued for breach of contract. Id.

188

Id. In theory, the idea that the shareholders are receiving some
compensation, even if not the full amount of the redemption, may reduce a
shareholder’s desire to bring suit.

189

190

Pro rata redemption clause was enforced in ThoughtWorks. Id.

191

Id.
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by law” be added to the preferences. For ideal protection, these two
clauses, the “prohibited by law” clause and the “pro rata redemption”
clause, can be bundled together. When combined, these clauses (1)
absolve the issuer of any legal duty to make a complete redemption if the
complete redemption would be restricted; and (2) authorize the issuer to
effectuate a pro rata redemption, to the extent permitted by law.
Suggested language could look like this:
[ ] Notwithstanding Section [ ], no
redemption shall be required if the
redemption is prohibited by law. If
redemption is prohibited by law, the
Company shall effectuate the redemption
pro rata, to the extent permitted by law,
according to the number of shares held
by each holder of Preferred Stock. The
pro rata redemption shall continue, to the
extent permitted by law, on a quarterly
basis until the redemption is fully
discharged. 192
By drafting with specificity and providing for pro rata
redemptions, issuers can resolve any ambiguities in the redemption
process, maximize the probability that they will be able to redeem at least
some of the preferred stock, and shield themselves from breach of
contract liability.
Second, issuers may desire to set out a method for valuing
corporate assets in the preferences of their preferred stock. The
valuation of an issuer’s net assets is a critical part of the analysis
underlying redemption restrictions, since “surplus” under DGCL § 160
is derived from the difference between “capital” and “net assets.” 193 A
The actual language a practitioner should use will vary widely depending on
the nature of the instrument, the preferences included, and the drafting desires
of the issuer and their counsel. This language is only a suggestion; what is
important is drafting the preferences in a way that eliminates the legal duty of
an issuer to completely redeem stock where a full redemption is prohibited
under DGCL § 160 or Delaware common law, yet be able to effectuate a pro
rata redemption in such a situation.
192

193

See cases cited supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
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common theme that can be observed in ThoughtWorks and TCV is that
preferred stockholders, in bringing suit against issuers for failing to
redeem, often cite issues concerning the issuer’s valuation of assets. 194
Issuers can circumvent valuation challenges by simply including a
valuation method or third party valuation expert, in the preferences of
their preferred stock. 195 Including a valuation method or export is
distinct, and should not be confused with, including valuation provisions
that require the issuer to value its assets as highly as possible, as seen in
ThoughtWorks. 196 This type of provision is discussed above. Instead, the
purpose of establishing a valuation method or expert is to prevent
valuation from being an issue in lawsuits, as was the case in ThoughtWorks
and Klang. 197
It is true that including a valuation method or expert in the
preferences of preferred stock may provide superfluous protection, since
established case law clearly provides issuers with discretion in valuing
assets. 198 However, to remove all doubt, issuers can protect themselves
against suits concerning the valuation of net assets by selecting a
valuation method or expert before issuing the preferred stock and
memorializing such in the preferences. In this way, drafting with
specificity as to valuation can protect issuers from liability.
Likewise, issuers may want, or be forced in negotiation, to
include a provision that states that the issuer’s board of directors must
value its corporate assets as highly as possible under the law. This type
SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 988–89 (Del. Ch.
2010), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011); TCV VI,
L.P. v. TradingScreen Inc., No. CV 10164-VCN, 2015 WL 1598045, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal refused, 115 A.3d 1216 (Del. 2015) (noting that “TCV
Funds and TradingScreen were unable to agree on the Preferred Stock's fair
market value . . . .”).

194

Agreeing to a valuation method or expert in the preferences will likely be
enforced, since the preferences are construed as a contract among shareholders.
Matulich v. Aegis Commc’ns. Grp., Inc., 942 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 2008).

195

196

ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d at 988–89.

Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 152 (Del. 1997)
(discussing dispute concerning methods of valuing a corporation’s assets).
197

198

See cases cited supra note 52–53 and accompanying text.
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of provision can maximize the probability that an issuer will be able to
redeem its preferred stock by increasing net assets, but not capital. 199 In
the same way, instructing the issuer’s board of directors to refrain from
allocating any surplus as capital can have a similar effect. 200 Therefore,
an issuer can increase its chances of being able to redeem its preferred
stock by maximizing net assets and surplus, yet limiting capital.
C. Avoid Negative Drafting
Finally, issuers can minimize their liability by avoiding negative
drafting. For example, in Brevan and TCV, the plaintiffs argued that
penalty provisions or VRTEs were triggered by the issuer’s failure to
redeem its preferred stock. 201 Obviously, penalty provisions, such as
paying interest on the amount of the unredeemed stock, or VRTEs are
undesirable for issuers. Consequently, issuers should attempt to exclude
penalties or VRTEs from the preferences of the preferred stock
altogether.
However, it is possible that issuers, as a matter of negotiation,
will sometimes be persuaded (or forced) to accept some forms of penalty
provisions or VRTEs. 202 This is particularly true where the preferred
stockholder desires for the preferred stock to function similarly to
debt. 203 When this happens, an issuer should structure the triggering
mechanism for the penalty or VRTE so that the provision will not apply
where redemption is prohibited by Delaware law. Sample language
could read as follows:

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2010). By increasing the probability that a
redemption will occur, issuer’s decrease their chances of being sued for failing
to redeem.

199

200

Id.

201

See cases cited supra notes 134, 166 and accompanying text.

Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian Rebuttal to the
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 152 (1997)
(noting that “[c]ompanies that seek venture capital financing are generally left
with no other alternatives for financing and are therefore in a weak bargaining
position[,]” which increases the probability that an issuer will be forced to
accept VRTE or penalty provisions in some situations).
202

203

See cases cited supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding Section [ ], no [Voting
Rights Triggering Event/Penalty] shall
apply where redemption of the Preferred
Stock is prohibited by law. 204
By eliminating penalty provisions and VRTEs, or at least
modifying the triggering events, issuers can limit their potential liability.
In addition, issuers should beware of “specific action” clauses.
While Brevan makes it clear that “all action” clauses will not be construed
as requiring an issuer to take all actions permitted by law to effectuate a
redemption, the Brevan Court leaves open the possibility that a “specific
action” clause could be enforced. 205 Due to the contractual nature of
preferred stock, if an issuer agrees in the preferences, to undertake
specific actions, such as selling certain assets, 206 to effectuate a
redemption, that agreement will likely be enforced, 207 provided that the
action to be taken is not inconsistent with Delaware law. 208
In sum, issuers should avoid negative drafting entirely. Where
negative drafting is required, issuers should consider redemption
restrictions when drafting their provisions and exclude an issuer’s failure
to redeem, due to redemption restrictions, from the list of triggering
events.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, issuers should be mindful of redemption
restrictions imposed by Delaware law when they draft the preferences
This language is only a suggestion; what is important is drafting the triggers
of the penalty provision or VRTE, so that nonredemption caused by
DGCL § 160 or Delaware common law will not trigger the penalty/VRTE.

204

205

See cases cited supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.

This in itself can create liability if the issuer agrees, in a specific action clause,
to sell an asset that it previously agreed it wouldn’t sell in a prior agreement.
Brevan Howard Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 9209-VCG, 2014 WL 2943570, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014). For
example, in Brevan, SBS was in a pickle because it previously agreed, in a bond
indenture, not to sell certain assets. Id.

206

207

Matulich v. Aegis Commc'ns Grp., Inc., 942 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 2008).

208

Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952).
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for redeemable preferred stock. The value and flexibility redemption
provisions afford issuers make redemption rights attractive additions to
the preferences. Nevertheless, as observed in ThoughtWorks, TCV, and
Brevan, redemption restrictions can transform redemption rights into a
potential source of liability for issuers.
To limit liability, issuers can do two things: (1) draft the
preferences in a way that maximizes the issuer’s ability to make a
required redemption when redemption is required; and (2) including
language in the preferences that limits the issuer’s liability for failing to
redeem its stock. Issuers can increase their probability of being able to
redeem their preferred stock by adding valuation provisions, allocating as
little of surplus as possible to capital, and avoiding penalty provisions or
VRTEs, which increase the cost of a redemption.
Meanwhile, issuers can limit their liability for failing to make a
redemption by taking three simple steps:
1. Excluding mandatory redemption rights and discretionary
put rights altogether. Where these provisions must be
included, provide that redemption is excused where
effectuating the redemption is prohibited by law in the
preferences;
2. Drafting with specificity by: (1) providing for pro rata
redemption if a complete redemption is restricted; and (2)
selecting a valuation method or expert ahead of time; and
3. Avoiding negative drafting by eliminating or limiting penalty
provisions, VRTEs, and “specific action” clauses.
By following these suggested practices, issuers will save time,
money, and human capital by avoiding liability and lawsuits, while
keeping their preferred shareholders happy by maximizing the
probability that they will be redeemed when promised. This Article
helps issuers’ counsel understand the perils posed by redemption
restrictions under Delaware law and creatively address these issues via
careful drafting. Overall, redemption restrictions can be reduced from a
major hurdle to a minor obstacle by understanding the law, applying
precedent while drafting preferred stock preferences, and following these
suggested practices.

